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NEGLIGENCE-PROXIMATE CAUSE-LIABILITY OF TAVERN-KEEPER TO THIRD
PERSON INJURED BY ONE TO WHOM TAVERN-KEEPER HAD MADE AN UNLAWFUL SALE OF LIQUOR-In a jurisdiction having a statute prohibiting
sales of liquor to minors and persons actually or apparently intoxicated,
defendants, four tavern-keepers, served alcoholic beverages to an eighteenyear-old minor. Fifteen or twenty minutes after leaving the last of the
taverns, the intoxicated minor negligently drove a motor vehicle and collided with plaintiff's car, killing plaintiff's husband. Plaintiff brought this
action as representative of her husband's estate and as owner of the damaged car. Her complaint charged not only that defendants unlawfully and
negligently sold and served alcoholic beverages to a minor under circumstances constituting notice that he was a minor, but also that the sale and
service by one or more of the defendants was at a time when the minor's
intoxicated condition was apparent. The trial court granted defendants
a summary judgment on the ground that the complaint failed to state a
cause of action. On certification directly to the Supreme Court, held,
reversed. Plaintiff's complaint states a cause of action in negligence. Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A. (2d) 1 (1959).
It was not an actionable tort at common law to sell or give intoxicating
liquor to a strong, able-bodied man.1 The consumption, rather than the
supplying of the liquor, was held to be the proximate cause of any injury
to the recipient or a third person resulting from intoxication of the recipient.2 If the recipient himself was injured, the supplier of the liquor had
the added defense of contributory negligence. 3 However, there were some

1 Cruse v. Aden, 127 Ill. 231, 20 N.E. 73 (1889); Howlet v. Doglio, 402 Ill. 311, 83
N.E. (2d) 708 (1949); Seibel v. Leach, 233 Wis. 66, 288 N.W. 774 (1939); BLACK, INT0XI·
CATING LIQUORS §281, p. 333 (1892).
2Fleckner v. Dionne, 94 Cal. App. (2d) 246,210 P. (2d) 530 (1949); Collier v. Stamatis,
63 Ariz. 285, 162 P. (2d) 125 (1945); Hitson v. Dwyer, 61 Cal. App. (2d) 803, 143 P. (2d)
952 (1943).
3 Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. (2d) 345, 289 P. (2d) 450 (1955).
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exceptions to a supplier's immunity to civil liability. If the recipient was
so drunk that he could be said to have lost his volition, the act of supplying him more liquor could constitute an assault and battery.4 Also, since
an innkeeper had a duty to use reasonable care in protecting guests from
injury by fellow guests,5 he could be held liable to a guest injured by
another guest who had become intoxicated on liquor obtained from the
innkeeper. Although this was not technically an exception to the rule
that the furnishing of liquor was not the proximate cause of ensuing injuries, 6 it did make the supplier liable for the results. Finally, one could
be held liable for interference with a wife's right to consortium by supplying liquor to her husband, resulting in his death, after having been expressly warned that he was a habitual drunkard.7 Here the sale was
analogized to the wrongful sale of habit-forming drugs.8 The habitual
drunkard was said to have lost his volition, 9 and the sale was viewed as
merging with the consumption, thus becoming the proximate cause of the
injury to the wife. Many states have dram shop acts extending the liability
of suppliers of liquor.10 Under these statutes proximate cause considerations have not stood in the way of holding suppliers liable for injuries
to third persons.11 The furnishing of the liquor is specifically made the
liability-creating act, and intervening acts, such as driving a car, have been
found not to break the causal connection between the furnishing and the
injury.1 2 In the absence of an applicable dram shop act, however, only
one other court has held that plaintiff had a good cause of action against
a supplier who violated a statute prohibiting sales of liquor to minors
and intoxicated persons.13 The reasoning of the principal case is that a

4 McCue v. Klein, 60 Tex. 168 (1883); Ibach v. Jackson, 148 Ore. 92, 35 P. (2d) 672
(1934).
5 Peck v. Gerber, 154 Ore. 126, 59 P. (2d) 675 (1936); Reilly v. 180 Club, Inc., 14 N.J.
Super. 420, 82 A. (2d) 210 (1951). Cf. Mastad v. Swedish Brethren, 83 Minn. 40, 85 N.W.
913 (1901).
6 See Cherbonnier v. Rafalovich, (D.C. Alaska 1950) 88 F. Supp. 900, holding that
reliance on only the innkeeper's sale of liquor to the intoxicated guest was not sufficient
to state a cause of action.
7 Swanson v. Ball, 67 S.D. 161, 290 N.W. 482 (1940); Pratt v. Daly, 55 Ariz. 535, 104 P.
(2d) 147 (1940).
8See Hoard v. Peck, 56 Barb. (N.Y.) 202 (1867), for an example of a habit-forming
drug case.
9 Cole v. Rush, (Cal. 1954) 271 P. (2d) 47, note, 53 MICH. L. REv. 632 (1955), revd. 45
Cal. (2d) 345, 289 P. (2d) 450 (1955), almost broke away from the requirement of loss of
volition, a step which would have allowed the sale to be considered a proximate cause.
10 For a list of states with such acts, see Ogilvie, "History and Appraisal of the Illinois
Dram Shop Act," 1958 UNIV. ILL. L.F. 175 at 180, n. 30. Prior to 1934 New Jersey had a
civil damage law imposing strict liability on unlawful sellers of alcoholic beverages.
11 McKinney v. Foster, 391 Pa. 221, 137 A. (2d) 502 (1958); Manning v. Yokas, 389 Pa.
136, 132 A. (2d) 198 (1957); Benes v. Campion, 186 Minn. 578, 244 N.W. 72 (1932).
12Ibid.
13 Waynick v. Chicago's Last Department Store, (7th Cir. 1959) 269 F. (2d) 322, note,
45 VA. L. REv. 1224 (1959), a recent federal case purporting not to rest on a dram shop
act, held that the unlawful sale of liquor, which contributed to the intoxication of the
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statute making sales of liquor to certain persons unlawful may raise a duty
on the part of the seller toward third persons,14 and that the sale may be
a proximate cause of injuries to such third persons when any intervening
acts which occur are foreseeable.15 The court in the principal case stresses
as necessary to finding the supplier negligent that the supplier knows, or
should know, that the recipient is a minor, or that he is intoxicated.16
This scienter requirement should prevent the extension of liability from
placing too great a burden17 on the supplier in states, such as New Jersey,
in which the violation of a statute is only evidence of negligence.18 It
might seem that no such limitation would be available in states in which
the statutory violation is negligence per se.19 Such a court could, however,
restrict liability if the scienter requirement were not met by introducing
the scienter requirement as a proximate cause consideration and finding
the injury in such a case not to be reasonably foreseeable. The result in
the principal case seems desirable both in attempting to keep the number
of intoxicated drivers on the highways to a minimum and in compensating the injured third party, who may have a better chance of collecting
damages from a tavern-keeper than from the driver. If a tavern-keeper
has unlawfully, with knowledge, contributed to the intoxication of a person
who, because of such intoxication, negligently injures a third person, the
tavern-keeper evokes little sympathy as against the innocent third party.

Alan C. Miller

purchaser, was a proximate cause of injuries to a third person, the injuries resulting from
the purchaser's negligent operation of an automobile. Contra: Cowman v. Hansen, (Iowa
1958) 92 N.W. (2d) 682; State v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 78 A. (2d) 754 (1951); Fleckner v.
Dionne, note 2 supra; Seibel v. Leach, note 1 supra. In the Cowman case the lack of proximate cause was attributed to the intoxicated person's driving a car. The court said that
the natural result of furnishing liquor to an intoxicated person might be injury to that
person, but not injury to a third as a result of the negligent driving of the intoxicated
person. This seems a tenuous conclusion in a day when so many people drive cars.
14 See PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 162 (1955).
15 Principal case at 8 (duty) and 9 (proximate cause).
16 Principal case at 9. Language indicating a similar requirement

appears in Waynick
v. Chicago's Last Department Store, note 13 supra: "It is apparent in the case at bar that
there are circumstances which make the sales of liquor .•• willful violations.•••"
17For criticism of a liberal dram shop act, see Ogilvie, "History and Appraisal of the
Illinois Dram Shop Act," 1958 UNIV. ILL. L.F. 175.
18 See Evers v. Davis, 86 N.J.L. 196, 90 A. 677 (1914).
19 See PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 161 (1955). Hitson v. Dwyer, note 2 supra, at 808, indicated that violation of a statute constituting negligence per se must be the proximate
cause of the injury to result in liability. Se 29 KY. L.J. 489 at 494 (1941). The negligence
per se doctrine bas not, therefore, interfered with the supplier's immunity to civil liability
in jurisdictions adhering to such a doctrine.

